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Can one participate in interpassivity when one does not much enjoy 
practical work? Let us be clear, one cannot escape practical tasks – even 
the task of writing, although filled with a certain pleasure in itself, is for 
the most part, a pragmatic even mundane undertaking. But is it 
interpassive?  
 According to Pfaller, one simply needs an object to transfer 
enjoyment upon.  But perhaps we first have to ask, what constitutes an 
experience of enjoyment?  Because to undertake interpassivity, one must 
first be able to identify and delineate the enjoyment to be transferred. 
Without the identification of enjoyment and the intention to transfer the 
enjoyment, is what can be termed interpassivity anything more than 
good old-fashioned displacement activity? Therefore, it appears that 
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central to interpassivity is the self-identification of enjoyment, followed by 
the intentional transfer of enjoyment. Here, do we not find ourselves back 
in that contested world of agency and the neo-liberal-derived mantra of 
rational choice?   
 
 But is interpassivity actually a conscious decision – rational or 
otherwise?  In our reading, Pfaller would say ‘no’; because interpassivity 
is an unconscious force that dupes us into thinking we are rational 
beings, in spite of our irrational behaviour. This of course means 
interpassivity, if thought through and not just engaged with, acts as a 
central challenge to the ideology of neo-liberalism.  For what seems to 
be the apparent is that firstly, there needs to be an interpassive 
environment one is intepellated within, and second, that one is engaged 
in some sort of transferential encounter with an object. And to be clear, 
this seems a bit strange, for after all, objects don’t speak – Lacan reminds 
us of this in his ecrit on science when he reminds us that objects don’t 
have mouths.  
 
 Let us return to the task of writing and a repetitive ‘joke’ our 
computer plays upon us – whenever we type the word, ‘continental’, our 
word check changes this to ‘congenital’. We are sure that we do not run 
a school for congenital philosophy. But we must admit to being quite 
amused every time this slip of the spell check occurs – as indeed we 
often are with other forms of ‘autocorrect’ whether typing or texting. That 
this happens is not interpassive in itself – it is the amusement which 
emerges that is the best part of being in an interpassive environment.  
This is even a joke we feel we can share. However, there are many other 
times when spell check is less amusing, annoying even. During these 
moments we are prone to muttering frustrated obscenities under our 
breath (what can be termed technotourettes!) – usually directed to our 
computer, the apparatus which apparently does not speak back to us. In 
such cases, the computer that has impeded our desire to communicate 
has become an interactive site of frustrated aggression: the ‘thing in itself’ 
that has perhaps even destroyed the enjoyment of writing.  
 




 What Pfaller alerts us to in his theory of interpassivity is that we 
have an inescapable inner monologue which is in part dependent on the 
object to fill our social bond. That is, there is little manoeuvring needed to 
bring the internal into the external – and vice versa – just that the 
unexpected encounter of the object speaking back is an uncanny 
realisation that we sort of expected it to anyway because it forms a 
fundamental part of our enjoyment. So the issue just identified, of the 
autocorrect non-correction is central to our interpassive participation 
with the object. That is, we expect the engagement to be, in some way, 
enjoyable – wither in the engagement itself, or more often, what the 
engagement will allow to occur. That is why the non-correction is so 
frustrating; it is the object itself denying the enjoyment, the jouissance we 
expect to experience, even in our practical life.  
 
 That we have an inner life which is separated from the practical 
work we undertake is an illusion. The objects we render to delegate our 
enjoyment – whether they be computers, art, capitalism, video-games 
and so on – are all part of our own pleasure-seeking and maintenance of 
jouissance. One does not need to be a practical person to enjoy the 
interpassive environment – perhaps objects even yield more pleasure for 
the impractical person. Who knows, perhaps objects can speak after all  
– we just might not like what they have to say… 
 
 The contributors of this issue all critically read and consider Pfaller 
and his interpassivity as a way of rethinking the subject of enjoyment.  
We are grateful for their close interrogations of our various pleasure 
objects, as frustrating, perverse or mundane as these objects can be: 
politics, art, the internet, belief, everyday life, science, religion, capital and 
so on. Perhaps interpassivity speaks most centrally to the political 
question of the mundane experience of life for so many. We desire the 
pleasure object and experience because life is lived for many of us in 
shades of mediocrity; the question is where and how – and if – 
interpassivity can integrate or operate with integrity. That which makes 
us think, of course can still be class-dominated and class-conscious, 
which means that while these public objects are quite enjoyable and 
privately pleasurable in their constant frustrations and impasses, they 




should never be considered as just object in themselves, outside of the 
structures and politics that makes them and their interpassive use 
possible.  
 
